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We consider a dynamic three-stage game played by two regulator-firm hierarchies to capture 
the scale and technological effects of opening markets to international trade. Each firm 
produces one good sold on the market. Firms can invest in R&D in order to lower their fixed 
emission/output ratio and are regulated with costly public funds. We take the context of 
sufficiently high market sizes and investment cost parameters. Opening markets to 
international trade yields more investment in R&D, more production and a lower emission 
ratio. When the market size is low enough and the investment cost parameter is high enough, 
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1.Introduction 
 
This paper studies the combination of the scale and technological effects of opening 
markets to international trade by means of a dynamic model where there is a possibility to 
invest in research and development (R&D) while supposing the existence of positive 
marginal social cost of public funds. We show that opening markets to foreign competitors 
may increase pollution and always decreases the social welfare. 
The relation between free trade and pollution can be explained by three main effects. 
The scale effect linking pollution to the scale of production and it is expected that 
international trade increases production and therefore pollution. The composition effect 
admits that certain dirty industries could relocate in countries with more lenient 
regulations. The technological effect refers to the possibility that international competition 
may encourage the innovation and diffusion of cleaner t echnologies to reduce the 
pollution intensity.  
Copeland and Taylor (1994) develop a static two-country general equilibrium model to 
isolate the scale, composition and technique effects of international trade on pollution. 
They show that trade liberalization may raise world pollution. Let’s notice that even if they 
isolate the technique effect, they don’t consider the possibility of investment in cleaner 
production technology because they suppose that it’s available and is characterized by 
abatement possibilities. Antweiler et al. (2001) have conducted empirical tests using data 
on sulfur dioxide concentrations and have shown that free trade reduces pollution. 
Reppelin-Hill (1999) empirically demonstrates that a cleaner technology (the electric arc 
furnace) is diffused more quickly in countries having more open trade regimes. However, 
these three last papers haven’t proved any result concerning the welfare effects of free 
trade. 
Karp et al. (2001) show that autarky is likely to Pareto-dominate free trade in the long 
run when the environment is fragile, and the result is reversed when the environment is 
resilient. Walz and Wellisch (1997) highlight that welfare-maximizing governments of 
exporting countries prefer free trade even if countries subsidize their local industries 
indirectly through ecological dumping. Péchoux and Pouyet (2003) show that, under 
incomplete information, international competition generated by the common market   3
enables regulators to reduce the informational rents captured by firms, thereby reinforcing 
the need to open the markets to international competition. 
The most important difference of our approach with respect to the above literature is 
that firms have the possibility to invest in R&D to lower their emission/output ratio, and 
we think that the better way to model the investment in cleaner technology is a dynamic 
model in which the production and innovation decisions are taken at different dates. Our 
approach is motivated by the fact that in many industries pollution is function of 
production with no abatement possibilities, and the only way to reduce the pollution 
intensity is to change the production process i.e. to invest in R&D.  
We consider a symmetric three-stage game played by a pair of regulator-firm 
hierarchies. In the third stage, each firm produces one good sold on the market. In the 
second stage, firms can invest in R&D in order to lower their fixed emission/output ratio. 
In the first stage, regulators propose non-cooperatively their contracts which should be 
accepted by their respective firms while giving the socially optimal levels of production, 
pollution and R&D. We study the full information context and suppose the existence of 
positive marginal social cost of public funds (l>0). Our objective is to compare the optimal 
equilibrium values in autarky and common market.  
Let’s notice the important role played by the positive marginal social cost of public funds 
because if it’s nil the equilibrium values in autarky and common market are equal. In our 
complete information context, the presence of positive l means that each regulator gives, 
in its social welfare function, a higher weight to the profit of its firm with respect to the 
consumer surplus and the damages caused by pollution. So, when markets are opened to 
international trade, competition of firms on the common market incites each regulator to 
increase its production to get a higher share of the common market and this forces them to 
decrease their emission ratio by increasing their R&D level to have less pollution with 
respect to the status quo in innovation. However, since the marginal cost of innovation is 
increasing, the R&D level doesn’t rise in a sufficiently quantity which might increase 
pollution. Consequently, international competition increases production and innovation 
which might reduce the profit of firms and increase pollution, thus, always reducing the 
social welfare.    4
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 presents the basic model when markets 
are separated. Section 3 treats the case of a common market. Section 4 compares the 
equilibrium values given by the autarky and common market regimes, and section 5 




Our symmetric model consists of two countries and two firms. Firm i located in country i 
is a regional monopoly and produces good i in quantity  qi sold in the domestic market 
with the following inverse demand function :  p a q a i i = - > 2 0 , . The size of each market is 
therefore a/2.  
As firm i is a regional monopoly that pollutes the domestic environment, it should be 
regulated. The regulator can use three types of instruments : a subsidy per-unit of R&D to 
induce the socially optimal levels of R&D and emission/output ratio, an emission tax per-
unit of pollution to induce the socially optimal levels of production and pollution, and a 
lump sum tax on profit to extract all the profit of the firm because of the positive marginal 
social cost of public funds. However, computations are very difficult with this first method 
of regulation. Indeed, the regulator must choose the socially optimal emission tax and 
subsidy in the first stage given the reaction of the firm which will choose its optimal levels 
of R&D and production in the second and third stages, respectively. Since our primary 
objective is to compare the socially optimal equilibrium values of production, innovation, 
pollution and social welfare in autarky and common market, we consider a second 
method of regulation which considerably eases computations. 
In the first stage, each regulator proposes to his firm a contract  ( , , ) q x T i i i  where  qi is 
the level of production that firm  i must produce,  xi is the level of R&D that must be 
attained by the innovation activity of the firm, and  Ti is a monetary transfer inducing the 
firm to accept this contract. The value of Ti is as such that the net profit of the firm will be 
at least equal to its reservation utility level which we assume to be equal to zero. When the 
monetary transfer is positive, the firm receives a subsidy, and when it’s negative, the firm   5
pays a tax. In the second stage, firms invest in R&D, and in the third one, they produce the 
contracted quantities. 
The production process generates pollution and firms can invest in R&D in order to 
decrease their fixed emission/output ratio. The level  xiof R&D costs 
2
i kx , where k>0 is an 
investment cost parameter. 
Denoting the marginal cost of production by  q>0, the profit of firm  i  is 
P i
a
i i i i i p q q q kx = - - ( ) q
2, and its net profit is  i i i
a
i i T x q U + P = ) , ( . 
By normalizing the emission/output ratio to one without innovation, the pollution ratio 
of firm i is :1  1 0 , 1 < < - = i i i x x e . 
The emission of pollution of firm i is thus : E e q i i i = . 
Damages caused to country i are purely local : 2  i i E D a = , where  a>0 expresses the 
sensitivity of consumers to the quality of the environment. 
The production of  qi engenders a consumer surplus in country  i  equal to 
2




i q q q p dt t p CS = - =￿ . 
Denoting the marginal social cost of public funds3 by  l>0, the consumer welfare of 




i T x q D q CS W ) 1 ( ) , ( ) ( l + - - = .      
The social welfare of a country is equal to the consumer welfare plus the net profit of the 
domestic firm :  i i i
a






i U x q x q D q CS U W S l l - P + + - = + = ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) ( . 
In our complete information setting, each regulator i maximizes his social welfare with 
respect to  i q ,  i x  and  i U   under the rationality constraint of firm i. We allow ourselves to 
express the regulator’s problem in function of Ui rather than  i T  because these latter are 
one-to-one related. Since the reservation utility level of firms is assumed to be equal to zero, 
the regulator chooses the monetary transfer so that the net profit of his firm is nil ( i U =0). 
Therefore, the social welfare of country i becomes: 
                                                                 
1 We suppose that there is no R&D spillovers between firms because we are able to compare the social 
welfare in the two market regimes only when this parameter is very small. See d’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988) for more on this topic. 
2In this paper, we ignore the possibility of transboundary pollution.  
3 See Laffont (1994) for more on this.   6
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i x q x q D q CS x q S P + + - = l                             (1) 
Expression (1) shows that a higher weight is given to the profit of the domestic firm in 
the social welfare function, with respect to the consumer surplus and the damages caused 
by pollution. 
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The resolution of (2) yields : 
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From expression (3), we have :       
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Therefore, the quantity produced by a firm increases with the increase of its own R&D 
level because it reduces its emission/output ratio, and doesn’t depend on the R&D level of 
the other firm because there is no interaction between the two hierarchies.  
The first order condition of the second stage is :  
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At the equilibrium, by using (2), equation (5) is simplified and, by using (3), its 
symmetric4 solution is :  
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a                                               (C.1) 
Therefore, our results are true when the market sizes are high enough. Otherwise, 
regulators will choose not to innovate nor to produce. 
We also need that  0 1 > -
a
i x  ￿ 








k                                                             (C.2) 
                                                                 
4 We look for the symmetric equilibrium because the model is symmetric and computations are easier. 
5 Alternatively, we can require that the numerator and denominator are both negative. However, this last 
condition will be incompatible with the concavity condition of the second stage.   7
Conditions (C.1) and (C.2) insure the second order condition of the second stage  and 




When firms produce perfect substitute goods sold in both countries, the inverse demand 
function becomes :  ) ( j i q q a p + - = . 
The firms profits are : 
2 ) ( i i i j i
cm
i kx q q q q p - - + = P q . 
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As in autarky, firms have a zero net profit and the social welfare of country i is :  
) , , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , , ( i j i
cm
i i i i j i
cm
i i j i
cm
i x q q x q D q q CS x q q S P + + - = l                     (7)       
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Resolving (8), we get : 
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From (9), we have :       
0
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 When a firm increases its level of R&D, this enables i t to produce more because its 
emission/output ratio is lowered. When the rival firm increases its level of innovation, this 
lowers its pollution ratio and therefore can produce more, forcing the initial competing 
firm to reduce its production.  
The first order condition of the second stage is :  
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> k                                                     (C.3)   8
Using (8), (9) and (10), the symmetric solution of (11) is :  
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We also need that  0 1 > -
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i x  ￿  
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Conditions (C.1) and (C.4) imply that the optimal R&D level is positive. 
The symmetric expression of (9) is :                     
[ ] a q l a
l
- - + +
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4.Separate markets versus common market 
 
The following results are verified under conditions (C.1) to (C.4) which imply that a and 
k are high enough. 
Let’s remark that if l is nil, then expressions (3), (6), (12) and (13) show that the optimal 
values in autarky and common market are equal.  
 
Proposition 1. The optimal R&D level and production are higher under common market than 
under separate markets whereas the emission/output ratio is lower. 
 
Competition on the common market leads to a higher level of production because of the 
strategic substituability of goods in the profit functions of firms. Such a raise in production 
is accompanied by a decrease in the emission ratio realized by increasing the level of R&D 
to cause less damages to the environment with respect to the status quo in innovation. 
 
Proposition 2. When a is sufficiently low and k is sufficiently high, pollution in common 
market is higher than in autarky. 
 
Opening markets to international trade increases production. To avoid major damages, 
regulators also increase the R&D level but not in a sufficient amount because R&D 
expenditures increase rapidly with the innovation level. Thus, pollution, which is the   9
product of the emission/output ratio and production, increases when markets are opened 
and when a is low enough and k is high enough. 
It is therefore expected that, under these conditions, the social welfare decreases when 
markets are opened to international trade.  
 
Proposition 3. Opening markets to international trade reduces the social welfare. 
 
When markets are opened to international trade, both the level of production and R&D 
increase. The result may be a decrease of the profit of firms, particularly because the 
marginal cost of innovation is increasing, and a rise of pollution which lead to a 




This model captures the scale and technological effects and tries to know the impact of 
opening markets to international trade on production, R&D, pollution and social welfare.  
We consider a dynamic and symmetric three-stage game played by two regulator-firm 
hierarchies in presence of costly public funds. Each firm produces one good sold on the 
market and can invest in R&D to lower its fixed emission/output ratio.  
Free mobility of goods between countries leads to both more investment in R&D and 
production, and to a lower emission ratio. When the market sizes are sufficiently low and 
the investment cost parameter is sufficiently high, international trade leads to an increase 
of pollution. The social welfare is always greater when markets are separated than when 
there is a common market. Indeed, when markets are opened to international trade, 
production and innovation increase which may reduce the profit of firms and increase 
pollution, thus, reducing the social welfare. Let’s point out that all these results are valid 
when the market sizes of countries and the investment cost parameter are high enough. 
A possible extension of this work is to introduce asymmetric information between the 
regulators and their respective firms concerning their production costs or R&D activity. 
Incomplete information may change our final result because competition of firms on the 
common market may reduce their informational rents and therefore increases the social   10
welfare. Another extension, which could imply difficult computations, is to consider the 




A)Proof of Proposition 1 
Using expressions (6) and (12), we show that x x i
cm
i
a - >0, which implies that e e i
cm
i





i x x > , from expressions (3) and (13), we also haveq q i
cm
i
a > .  
 
B)Proof of Proposition 2 
Consider the function  [ ] a q l a - - + + - = ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( a x x x f i i i . 
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Using the expressions of 
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Thus, when a is low enough and k is high enough, opening markets to international trade 
increases pollution. 
 
C)Proof of Proposition 3 
Using expressions (1) and (7), the equilibrium social welfare of country i can be written as :  
[ ]
2 2 ) 1 ( ) ( ) )( 1 ( )) ( )( 2 1 ( i i i i i i i kx x q a x x q S l a q l a l + - - - + + + + - =  
Using expressions (3) and (13) : 
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 in common market. It’s easy to 
verify that d d
a cm > . 
Consider the function  [ ]
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Using conditions (C.1) and (C.2),  [ ]
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i x , we show that 
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